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Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense"
Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases
Sandra Levitsky*
In December 1992, Francine Ryczek worked as a student
intern for Guest Services, a Washington, D.C.-based company
specializing in the culinary arts. During her tenure at Guest
Services she worked under the supervision of Chef Catherine
O'Brien.' Ryczek alleges that early in her tenure, O'Brien
expressed having a sexual preference for women. O'Brienwent on
to inquire into Ryczek's own sexual activities, commenting to and
touching Ryczek in ways Ryczek felt were sexual and inappropri-
ate.2 At one point, O'Brien caught Ryczek alone in an elevator and
removed her own shirt in an apparent attempt to elicit a sexual
response from Ryczek.' Ultimately, Ryczek felt compelled to leave
the program due to what she perceived as an environment filled
with sexual harassment.4 Ryczek subsequently sued Guest
Services under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'
Guest Services moved for summary judgment on Ryczek's
claim, arguing Title VII created no cause of action for sexual
harassment involving members of the same gender.' In an
attempt to invoke a Title VII loophole unintentionally created by
Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III in Barnes v. Costle,7 Guest
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1993,
Amherst College.
1. Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc. 877 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. As a result, Ryczek received a failing grade on one project for the
internship, required counseling, and missed several months of school and work.
Id. at 756-57.
5. Id. at 757. Ryzcek also asserted claims for breach of contract, breach
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent supervision, tortious
interference with contract, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
6. Id.
7. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Services argued O'Brien was bisexual.' Judge Robinson stated in
his now-notorious footnote fifty-five that"[in the case ofabisexual
superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute
gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female
employees alike."9
The Ryczek facts bring to life a legal debate which for two
decades has existed only in the realm of the hypothetical.'0
Courts have acknowledged that under current sexual harassment
standards, harassers are liable for sex discrimination only when
they treat members of one sex differently than members of the
opposite sex." Thus in cases of equal opportunity sexual harass-
ment, 2 in which a person presumably harasses both men and
women equally, victims have no Title VII remedy." As Guest
Services' arguments in Ryczek suggest, many courts also deny a
Title VII cause of action to victims of same-sex sexual harassment.
Courts do so for the same reason they deny a cause of action to
victims of equal opportunity sexual harassment-the harassment
was not based on "sex."'4 Such a result seems inappropriate
given that victims of equal opportunity and same-sex sexual
harassment suffer no less an injury from sexual harassment than
victims of opposite-sex sexual harassment. Ryczek found her
workplace no less hostile, demeaning or offensive because her
harasser was bisexual or homosexual.
This Note uses same-sex and equal opportunity sexual
harassment cases to illustrate the inadequacies of current sexual
harassment standards under Title VIrs "because of ... sex"
8. Ryczek, 877 F. Supp. at 761.
9. Id. (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
While the Ryczek court declined to rule on the issue of same-sex or bisexual
sexual harassment, it did state in dictum that the D.C. Circuit did not
"recognize a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment when the supervisor
[was] bisexual." Id. at 761-62.
10. Judge Robinson first raised the issue of the bisexual harasser in Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11. See infra note 81 (citing cases in which courts acknowledged an
inability to reconcile current sexual harassment doctrine with the case of equal
opportunity sexual harassment).
12. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
bisexual and equal opportunity sexual harassment).
13. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating in dicta that victims of equal opportunity harassment have no Title VII
cause of action), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
14. See sources cited infra note 81 (denying a Title VII cause of action to
victims of same-sex sexual harassment).
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requirement. 5 It offers an alternative analysis that recognizes
inequalities in the workplace exist independently of whether
employers treat men differently from women. Part I discusses
current and evolving definitions of sexual harassment and their
application to same-sex and equal opportunity sexual harassment
cases. Part II discusses the courts' use of the "but for" causation
test in sexual harassment cases. It argues the test allows for too
much judicial discretion in deciding when sexual harassment
occurs "because of sex," and this discretion disproportionately
affects victims of same-sex and equal opportunity sexual harass-
ment. It then criticizes the use of a comparative standard in
sexual harassment cases for not recognizing cases in which
discrimination occurs when employers appear to treat men and
women similarly. Part II also discusses legislative proposals for
resolving the problems faced by victims of same-sex and equal
opportunityharassment and argues these proposals fail to address
the inadequacies of current sexual harassment standards. Part III
then proposes an alternative standard that would eliminate both
the "but for" and comparative standards in favor of an analysis
holding employers accountable for any harassment that is based
on gender or gender stereotypes which perpetuate a gender
hierarchy.
I. EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. TITLE VII, THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE, AND ITS PROGENY
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."" Congress enacted the original version of the civil rights
bill as a remedy for discrimination against blacks and other racial
minorities, and not necessarily as a remedy for discrimination
against women." In fact, Representative Howard Smith of
15. See infra text accompanying note 16 (quoting the protective language
of Title VII).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
17. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)
(stating that the language of Title VII makes plain Congress's purpose was to
eliminate "those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens");
see also Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title VII's Straight Arrow
Approach: Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment Discrimi-
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Virginia, a strident opponent of the civil rights bill, introduced the
additional category of "sex" to the bill as a political attempt to
assure the bill's defeat.'" Records of the House committee
hearings on Title VII contain no discussion of sex discrimina-
tion.'9 Nevertheless, the House passed Smith's amendment and
eventually the entire Civil Rights Act.20
The Act's prohibitions apply to most employers in the United
States."' Unlawful employment practices under Title VII include
discriminating on the basis of sex in hiring or firing, wages and
salaries, promotions, or any terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.22 Title VII also prohibits an employer from taking
any action against a person filing a charge of discrimination under
the Act.2" Responsibility for administering and enforcing Title
VII lies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).2 4
1. Overview of the Equality Principle
In the struggle to gain access to a wider range ofjob opportuni-
ties, women have relied on Title VII as their primary litigation tool
and the "equality principle" as the analytical basis for their legal
arguments.25 Basic to both our political and legal system, the
nation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1536 n.11 (1993) (describing the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as specifically targeting discrimination against blacks).
18. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 15 (1995)
19. Peluso, supra note 17, at 1537 n.15. Women had been lobbying for a
federal law proscribing sex-based discrimination in employment for many years.
Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310
(1968). Congress responded to these lobbying efforts by passing the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, but there was little congressional support for a law directly
outlawing employment discrimination based on sex. Id.
20. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 18, at 16.
21. Title VII generally applies to private employers and labor unions of
fifteen or more people, public and private employment agencies, and educational
institutions as well as State and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. For





25. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1989); see also DEBORAH L.
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 81-107 (1989) (describing the emergence of
contemporary gender discrimination analysis); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 198-99
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equality principle is based on the belief that society should treat
similarly situated people similarly." Under this doctrine,
employment discrimination occurs when employers treat em-
ployees who are similarly situated differently." Consequently,
sexual harassment is a form of employment discrimination
because it is one method of treating some employees differently
than others.28
In 1986, the Supreme Court articulated how sexual harass-
ment constituted a form of discrimination "because of sex" in the
landmark decision of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:29
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality
at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege ofbeing allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."0
In a separate case, the Court also noted that a discriminatorily
abusive work environment will often detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
(1989) (describing the use of equality theory in early feminist scholarship);
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142 (1986) (discussing the
improvements women have achieved in the workplace by appealing to the
equality theory); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate:
A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory,
1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 300-01 (same).
26. Finley, supra note 25, at 1142.
27. See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming:Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT.
REv. 201, 205-06 (discussing the definition of discrimination under the formal
equality doctrine).
28. See generally Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-26
(1991) (discussing the application of Title VII to sexual harassment discrimi-
nation).
29. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For sexual harassment to be actionable, the Court
held that it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. at
67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim, the Court noted, is that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome. Id. at 68.
The Meritor standard for sexual harassment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). In Harris,
a unanimous Court held that harassing conduct need not cause psychological
injury for a plaintiff to bring an actionable Title VII claim. Id. at 370-71. "So
long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as
hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious."
Id. at 371.
30. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
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keep them from advancing in their careers.3 One premise
behind characterizing sexual harassment as discrimination is that
an employee of one sex should not have to endure abusive working
conditions if an employee of the opposite sex is working abuse-free.
2. Current Standards for Characterizing Sexual Harassment
as Discrimination: The "But For" and Comparative
Standards
Title VII does not proscribe all offensive sexual conduct in the
workplace, only harassment that a person directs toward a victim
because of his or her sex.32 To determine whether harassment
occurs because of the victim's sex, the court applies two tests, one
to determine causation and the other to determine whether the
harassment was discriminatory."3 Typically, courts attempt to
determine causation by applying a"but for" test modeled after tort
law concepts-but for the plaintiff's sex, would the plaintiff have
been the object of harassment? 4 The "but for" test requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that because of his or her "sex," the
harasser singled out the victim for harassment.35 Victims of
31. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
33. See McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229,
232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff must establish harassment was
"based upon sex" by showing that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have
been the object of harassment, and that her harasser did not treat male
employees in a similar fashion); Valadez v. Uncle Julio's of Illinois, Inc., 895 F.
Supp. 1008, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating the "critical issue" as whether the
plaintiff was exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which male employees were not exposed); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887
F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (applying the McCoy two part test to a
determination of sexual harassment); see generally Martha Chamallas, Listening
to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REv. 89,
100-04 (1990).
34. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[A] substantive violation [of Title VII] only occurs when
consideration of an illegitimate criteria is the 'but for' cause of an adverse
employment action."); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982) (stating that to prove a claim for sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object
of harassment).
35. In Price Waterhouse, the Court stated:
In determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a
given event, we begin by assuming that the factor was present at the
time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had been
absent, the event nevertheless would have transpired in the same way.
490 U.S. at 240. The Court further explained that the critical inquiry is
whether gender was a factor at the moment an employment decision was made.
BISEXUAL DEFENSE LOOPHOLE
same-sex and equal opportunity sexual harassment have had
difficulty meeting this test because judges often conclude that the
harasser's "sexual orientation" was the motivation for the
harassing conduct rather than the victim's "sex." 6
In addition to the "but for" test, courts apply a comparative
standard to determine whether harassment was discriminatory:
Did the harasser treat the plaintiff differently than a similarly
situated employee of the opposite sex?37 Some courts have found
the comparative standard problematic for victims of same-sex
harassment because there is no similarly situated employee of the
opposite sex with which to compare the victim's treatment.
Moreover, the harasser is not harming the victim based on the
victim's sex, because the harasser and the victim are of the same
sex. 8 "[The same-sex harasser] certainly does not despise the
entire [sex], nor does he wish to harm its members, since he is a
member himself and finds others of the group sexually attrac-
tive." 9 Similarly, courts cannot readily apply the comparative
standard to cases of equal opportunity sexual harassment. The
harasser in such cases does not treat the plaintiff differently than
members of the opposite sex-by definition, the harasser harasses
When an employer considers sex along with legitimate factors at the time of
making an employment decision, the "because of sex" requirement is met. Id.
at 241.
36. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text (describing the "but for"
standard and its application to same-sex and equal opportunity harassment
cases).
37. The EEOC Compliance Manual states: "[Tihe crucial inquiry is whether
the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members
of the other sex." EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1993)
[hereinafter EEOC MANUAL]. For courts relying on the EEOC language, see
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995);
Vandeventer v. Wabash Natl Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. IlM. 1995);
see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("The critical issue.., is whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed.")
38. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. IM. 1988)
("During the times relevant to his claim, Goluszek was a male in a male-
dominated environment. In fact, with [one] exception.., each and every one
of the figures in this story was a male.... Goluszek may have been harassed
'because' he is a male, but that harassment was not of a kind which created an
anti-male environment in the workplace."); see also infra note 73 (citing cases
which rely upon the court's reasoning in Goluszek).
39. Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 333, 352 (1990).
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both sexes equally."
3. Current Definitions of Sexual Harassment
According to the EEOC Guidelines,4' sexual harassment
occurs when "submission to [unwelcome sexual] conduct42 is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment."43 Under the regulatory guidelines,
there are two types of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" and
40. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (defining equal opportu-
nity harassment).
41. Congress granted the EEOC authority to issue regulations to carry out
the provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12. EEOC regulations, "while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
42. The EEOC has endorsed the Eleventh Circuit's definition of "unwel-
come conduct"; the conduct must be unwelcome "in the sense that the employee
did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the
conduct as undesirable or offensive." EEOC MANUAL, supra note 37, $ 3114
(Mar. 19, 1990) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The Supreme Court in Meritor held that a plaintiffs voluntariness "in the sense
that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will" in sex-
related conduct, did not preclude a finding that the conduct was "unwelcome."
477 U.S. at 68-69. Thus, a court could find that a plaintiff was coerced into
engaging in a sexual relationship with a supervisor, even though as a matter
of criminal law she had "consented" to such a relationship. Debra L. Raskin,
Sexual Harassment in Employment, 108 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 141, 145
(1995).
The welcome or unwelcome nature of sexual advances is often one of the
most disputed elements of hostile work environment claims. Id. at 144. Susan
Estrich has argued that the unwelcomeness requirement should be eliminated
from both quid pro quo and hostile work environment cases altogether because,
in practice, the actions of both traditional and nontraditional women can be
used against them to negate a finding of unwelcomeness:
A woman who behaves in the most stereotypical ways-complimenting
men, straightening their ties ... eating dinner with the boss on a
business trip, or remaining friendly even after rejecting his ad-
vances-may find that the sexual advances she rejects are, as a matter
of law, not unwelcome. Similarly, women who act too much like
men-who use "crude and vulgar language," or choose to eat with the
men in the employee lunchroom--cannot be heard to complain of a
worksite which is "permeated by an extensive amount of lewd and
vulgar conversation and conduct."
Estrich, supra note 28, at 830; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Sexual Harassment,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1462-63 (1992) (criticizing the unwelcomeness
requirement for focusing on the victim's behavior and judging whether the
harasser's behavior was illegal based on the victim's conduct).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1995).
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"hostile environment."" Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
an employer uses submission to or rejection of sexual advances,
sexual favors, and other sexual conduct as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting an employee.45 A manager conditioning
an employee's raise upon submission to a request for sexual favors,
or a supervisor demoting or firing a subordinate for refusing to
engage in sexual conduct, are both examples of quid pro quo sexual
harassment.46
Alternatively, hostile environment harassment includes
unwelcome sexual conduct that"unreasonably interfer[es] with an
individual's work performance or creat[es] a hostile, intimidating
or offensive working environment."47 Unlike quid pro quo
harassment cases, plaintiffs in a hostile work environment case do
not have to demonstrate that they suffered some form of economic
injury, such as discharge, demotion, or loss of promotion or
salary.48 The Court has held that "Title VII affords employees
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult," regardless of whether harass-
ment leads to economic injury.49
To determine whether offending conduct is sufficiently "severe
44. Id. § 1604.11(a)(2)-(3).
45. Id. § 1604.11(a)(2). To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo
harassment, a plaintiff must prove that the employee is a member of a
protected class; that the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; that
the harassment was based on sex; that the employee's submission to the
unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job
benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual
demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and the existence of employer
liability. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
46. See Janet Hughie Smith et al., Sex Discrimination in the Workplace:
Some Guidelines for Employers and Legal Update, 983 ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY 135, 140 (1995) (describing situations that may constitute quid pro quo
harassment).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). An employee asserting a claim of hostile
work environment sexual harassment must prove that the employee belongs to
a protected group; that the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; that the harassment was based on sex; and that the harassment
affected a term, condition or privilege of employment and was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment. Raskin, supra note 42, at 150 (citing Sparks v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987). The "based
on sex" element in both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims increasingly has become the subject of dispute in equal opportunity
and same-sex sexual harassment cases. Id. at 153.
48. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
49. Id.
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and pervasive"" as to constitute hostile work environment sexual
harassment, courts look to the "record as a whole" and the "totality
of the circumstances."51 Circumstances may include the fre-
quency and severity of the behavior, whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance, and whether the harasser
was in a position of superiority at the time of the harassment.52
B. EXPANDING DEFINITIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The most widely recognized form of sexual harassment
involves the harassment of a female employee by a male super-
visor, typically in the form of sexual innuendoes or propositions. 3
Courts have expanded this "classic" definition of sexual harass-
ment to include situations in which a woman is not herself the
object of harassment, but where she is forced to work in an
atmosphere in which such harassment is pervasive, 54 as well as
to situations in which the harassment is not clearly sexual in
nature.55 Courts are divided on the issue of whether they should
expand the definition of sexual harassment to instances in which
a supervisor harasses a member of the same sex or harasses men
50. For sexual harassment to be actionable, the Court in Meritor held it
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 67 (quoting
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
51. Id. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
52. See Smith, supra note 46, at 140-41 (describing factors the EEOC and
courts will consider in hostile work environment cases); see also Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (listing those circumstances which
courts should examine in determining whether an environment is "hostile or
abusive").
53. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 37, 3101.
54. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Even a
woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII
claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment
was pervasive."), cert. granted sub noma., PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S.
815, and affd sub noma., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
55. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding offensive conduct is not necessarily required to include sexual
overtones in every instance); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding sexual harassment does not have to take the form of sexual
advances or other incidents with clearly sexual overtones). But see Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622-24 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding a workplace
replete with pornography and male supervisors who regularly call female
employees names like "cunt," "pussy," and "whore" would not interfere with a
reasonable person's work performance or psychological well-being), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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and women equally.5 6 At the heart of the dispute is the question
of whether such harassment occurs because of the victim's sex.5"
1. Distinguishing Sex from Gender
Title VH does not define "sex," and the Supreme Court has not
defined "gender" or "sex" as legal concepts.58 Yet the distinction
plays a crucial role in same-sex and equal opportunity sexual
harassment cases. This Note uses "sex" to refer to all that is
biological-chromosomes, hormones and genitalia.59 "Gender,"
on the other hand, refers to what society labels "masculine" and
"feminine."6" It is what one acquires as a social role from social
expectations for the ways each sex should act, look, feel and
speak.6' These social expectations, often referred to as gendered
scripts,62 are commonly mutually exclusive between male and
female.6" Society tends to expect men to act aggressive, competi-
56. See infra notes 70, 74 and accompanying text (citing cases recognizing
a cause of action for same-sex and equal opportunity sexual harassment).
57. See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text (discussing debate over
whether same-sex and equal opportunity harassment occurs "because of sex").
58. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law & Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 23 (1995) (noting the absence
of legal definitions for "sex" and "gender" under either Title VII or Supreme
Court cases). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized the word "sex"
in Title VII means "gender" as well. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing a brief
explanation of the distinction between "sex" and "gender"); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1986) (stating Title VII "sex" language means
"gender" distinctions must be irrelevant to employment); see also Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of gender); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating "sex" in Title
VII means "gender"); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 n.1 (D.
Nev. 1995) (noting the Supreme Court uses the broader term "gender" when
referring to Title VIrs "sex" provision); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
871 F. Supp. 822, 832 n.17 (M.D. Md. 1994) (same). But see Dillon v. Frank, 58
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332, at 70,104 n.2 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (relying
on the biological definition of "sex" in denying a Title VII cause of action to a
victim of same-sex harassment).
59. See JOHN MONEY, GAY, STRAIGHT AND IN BETWEEN 52-53 (1988)
(describing the distinction between "sex" and "gender"); I. Bennett Capers,
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1158, 1160 (1991) (same).
60. Capers, supra note 59, at 1160.
61. See MONEY, supra note 59, at 52-53 (distinguishing "sex" from "gender").
62. Id.
63. SANDRA L. BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER 80-81 (1993); see also MARILYN
FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALI=Y 31-33 (1983) (describing how society constructs
and maintains a gender dichotomy); Capers, supra note 59, at 1160-62 (same).
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tive, assertive, analytical and rational, and women to act passive,
deferential, affectionate, sexy and attractive. 64 Society, and in
this context employers, too often values more highly those
characteristics associated with being male than those associated
with being female.65
2. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Courts not only have to resolve cases of sexual harassment
without the assistance of concrete legal definitions for sex and
gender, they also must resolve cases involving parties with
increasingly diverse combinations of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation.66 Most reported cases of sexual harassment involve
harassment of an employee by a heterosexual supervisor of the
opposite sex.67 In contrast, same-sex sexual harassment occurs
in two forms. First, it may occur when a homosexual supervisor or
64. FRYE, supra note 63, at 31-33; Capers, supra note 59, at 1162; see also
Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 335, 352-53 (1992) (describing gender stereotypes).
65. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS 14, 233 (1988)
(arguing dichotomous distinctions like male-female are ranked comparisons,
with those characteristics associated with being male ranking higher); FRYE,
supra note 63, at 32 (describing gender differences as systematically benefiting
men and disadvantaging women); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 187, 208 (arguing the social meanings
attached to gender systematically favor men in both public and economic
spheres). Barbara Gutek argues that women are seen as sexual beings and
men as organizational beings. Gutek, supra note 64, at 352-53. She notes the
stereotypes are mutually exclusive: in most cases it is virtually impossible to be
both sexual and a worker at the same time. Id. at 354-55.
66. See Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 61 (D.P.R. 1995)
(involving female supervisor sexually harassing female employee); Roe v. K-
Mart Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WIL 316783, *1 (D.S.C. March 28,
1995) (involving gay, male supervisor sexually harassing gay male employee);
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (D. Wyo. 1993)
(involving male supervisor sexually harassing male and female employees);
Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp 1, 4 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(involving anti-gay harassment of male employee by male coworkers).
67. The typical case involves a male supervisor who sexually harasses a
female employee, but courts also have recognized that female supervisors may
sexually harass male employees. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ('The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment.") (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)); see also Baskerville
v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Sexual harassment of
women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the
possibility that sexual harassment of men by women ... would not also be
actionable in appropriate cases.").
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coworker sexually harasses an employee of the same sex.68
Second, same-sex harassment may involve anti-gay harassment
of a homosexual employee or an employee coworkers believe to be
homosexual. 9
Courts have equivocated over the past twenty-five years on
whether they should recognize a Title VII cause of action for same-
sex sexual harassment. District court opinions in the 1980s held
that Title VII proscribed both opposite-sex and same-sex harass-
ment.7" In 1988, however, the District Court for the Northern
District of Ilinois held Title VII remedies do not extend to same-
sex sexual harassment in the highly influential case of Goluszek v.
Smith.7 The court reasoned it was not "the type of conduct
Congress intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII." 72
Currently, the courts are divided between those that adhere to
68. See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala.
1983) (involving male employee harassed by gay supervisor), affd, 749 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (same).
69. See, e.g., Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (involving plaintiff subjected to verbal abuse--"faggot" and
"queer"-as well as physical abuse-a broom handle was forced against his
rectum). Courts have uniformly held that anti-gay harassment is not actionable
under Title VII. See cases cited infra note 76 (discussing anti-gay harassment
as lying outside the purview of Title VII). Because victims of both types of
same-sex harassment face similar obstacles when establishing a prima facie
case of sexual harassment, this Note generally refers to both types as "same-
sex" harassment. See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text (discussing
courts' tendency to conflate sex with sexual orientation in cases of same-sex and
anti-gay harassment). When discussing the ways in which courts treat victims
of the two types of same-sex harassment differently, this Note refers to the first
as "same-sex" harassment and the second as "anti-gay" harassment.
70. See, e.g., Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 541 (holding quid pro quo male-male
harassment violates Title VII); Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310 (same). But see
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The total
lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the
circumstances of the amendment's adoption clearly indicates that Congress
never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other
than the traditional concept of sex."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
71. 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Anthony Goluszek worked as
a mechanic in a mostly male factory. Coworkers persistently taunted Goluszek,
targeting his sexuality. The court heard testimony that Goluszek "blushed
easily" and was abnormally sensitive to comments pertaining to sex. Id. at
1453. Coworkers periodically asked Goluszek if he had got any "pussy," showed
him pictures of nude women, told him they would get him "fucked," and accused
him of being gay or bisexual. Id. at 1454. They poked him in the buttocks with
a stick and made comments to him about "butt fucking in the ass." Id.
72. Id. at 1456.
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Goluszek's reasoning73 and those that dispute Goluszek, holding
same-sex sexual harassment actionable under Title VII. 4
Courts recognizing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment are careful to distinguish actionable same-sex
harassment from anti-gay harassment.75 Courts have uniformly
held anti-gay harassment is based exclusively on sexual orien-
tation, and that such harassment does not fall within Title VIrs
proscriptions." This distinction creates the absurd situation in
which courts are willing to hold gay men and lesbians liable for
sexual harassment, but will not allow them to recover when they
are themselves victimized by anti-gay workplace harassment."
3. Equal Opportunity Sexual Harassment
While same-sex sexual harassment presents a twist to the
73. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994);
Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489,494 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis
v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (D.S.C. 1995); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994); Polly v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
74. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995)
(noting the Goluszek court did not support its proposition with any citations to
the legislative record); EEOC v. Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D.
Tenn. 1995) (refuting the idea that Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove that
the harasser is not of the same gender); Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
App. 4th 1409, 1417 (disputing the Goluszek conclusion that the harassment
involved was not the kind Congress intended to sanction when it enacted Title
VII).
75. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (differentiating between
same-sex and anti-gay harassment).
76. See Vandeventer v. Wabash NaI Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) ("People who are harassed because they are homosexual--or are
perceived as homosexual-are not protected by Title VII any more than are
people who are harassed for having brown eyes."); Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332, at 70,104 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1990) (holding Title VII
does not proscribe discriminatory conduct based on sexual orientation);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); see
also EEOC MANUAL, supra note 37, 3101 ("If a male supervisor harasses a
male employee because of the employee's homosexuality, then the supervisor's
conduct would not be sexual harassment since it is based on the employee's
sexual preference, not on his gender. Title VII covers charges based on gender
but not those based on sexual preference."); cf HARVARD LAw REVIEW, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAw 69 (1990) (stating no plaintiff has recovered under
the theory that sexual orientation discrimination is essentially a form of gender
discrimination).
77. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEo. L.J. 1, 10
(1992) (noting that while Title VII protects employees from gays and lesbians,
Title VII does not protect gays and lesbians).
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classic male-on-female sexual harassment scenario, the case of the
equal opportunity harasser challenges the very basis of current
sexual harassment doctrine. Like same-sex sexual harassment
cases, there are two types of cases involving the "bisexual de-
fense.""8 In bisexual sexual harassment cases, the person haras-
sing an employee is actually bisexual, but may not necessarily
harass members of both sexes." In equal opportunity sexual
harassment cases, the supervisor sexually harasses members of
both sexes, but may not actually be bisexual."0 Most courts have
acknowledged that equal opportunityharassmentis not actionable
under current Title VII sexual harassment standards.8 ' Defen-
dants continue, however, to raise the "bisexual defense" in both
78. See Ryczek v. Guest Servs., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761 n.6 (D.D.C. 1995)
("The Court notes that [footnote fifty-five] in Barnes could be interpreted to
prohibit Title VII sexual harassment cases any time a supervisor is bisexual.
Alternatively, the language could mean that a supervisor is only immune from
Title VII sexual harassment suits when there is evidence that the supervisor
has actually harassed members of both sexes.").
79. InRyczek, for example, the defendants argued O'Brien was bisexual, not
that she actually harassed members of both sexes. Id. at 761.
80. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Coosa Valley Medical Ctr., No. CV 93-PT-2710-E,
1995 WL 241937, at *26-28 (N.D. Ala. March 20, 1995) (finding defendant
harassed both men and women equally). In Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp.,
the court referred to harassers whose remarks are gender driven and directed
at both men and women as "equal opportunity harassers." 826 F. Supp. 1334,
1337 (D. Wyo. 1993). Because victims of both bisexual and equal opportunity
sexual harassment face similar obstacles under current sexual harassment
doctrine, this Note uses the more general term "equal opportunity harassment"
to refer to both.
81. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating that equal opportunity harassment is not gender discrimination), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 n.11
(11th Cir. 1982) ("Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual
supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based
upon sex."); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Only by
a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex
discrimination-where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike.");
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283,288 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that
there is no discrimination in cases where a supervisor harasses both sexes
equally); Ryczek, 877 F. Supp. at 761 n.6 (noting the language of footnote 55 in
Barnes suggests that a supervisor is immune from Title VII sexual harassment
suits when there is evidence that he or she harassed members of both sexes);
Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336-37 (stating that current legal doctrines such
as burden of proof or causation would require adjustments to adequately
address the issue of equal opportunity harassment); cf Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating it would be "ludicrous" to
call sexual harassment sex discrimination "because to do so would mean that
if the conduct complained of [(sexual advances from male supervisor to female
employees)] was directed equally to males there would be no basis for suit").
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types of cases.8 2
Under current sex discrimination doctrine, a court typically
concludes something happens because of sex when it happens to
one sex but not the other.8" "The initial procedure is arithmetic:
draw a gender line and count how many of each are on each side in
the context at issue." 4 Because Title VII is premised on an ideal
of formal equality that defines discrimination as the act of treating
men and women differently who are actually similarly situated, 5
equal opportunity harassment is not sex discrimination.8"
Courts have recognized in dicta that such an analysis
produces an anomalous result: "a victim of sexual harassment...
would have a Title VII remedy in all situations except those in
which the victim is harassed by a particularly unspeakable cad
82. The District Court for the District of Columbia first raised the issue by
stating in a footnote that:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on a
male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a
subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the same
gender. In each instance, the legal problem would be identical to that
confronting us now-the exaction of a condition which, but for his or
her sex, the employee would not have faced. These situations, like that
at bar, are to be distinguished from a bisexual superior who conditions
the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon
participation in a sexual affair. In the case of a bisexual superior, the
insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimi-
nation because it would apply to male and female employees alike.
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.D.C. 1977); see infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text (describing defendants' use of the "bisexual defense").
83. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
107 (1979).
84. Id.
85. See Becker, supra note 27, at 208 (discussing definitions of equality and
discrimination under the formal equality doctrine); see also supra text
accompanying notes 25-27 (describing the formal equality doctrine generally).
86. That a harasser could escape liability under Title VII because the
harasser harassed men and women equally contradicts the reasoning of the
Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Loving
Court rejected the argument that equal application of a racially discriminatory
statute removes the statute from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions.
Id. at 8. The Court stated that the fact that both races were subject to a
discriminatory statute did not take away from the Virginia legislature's racially
motivated purpose in designing a statute to maintain white supremacy. See id.
at 7-8 (rejecting the State's "equal application" theory and finding the State
designed the statute to maintain white supremacy). Similarly, if we acknowl-
edge that sexual harassment is part of a system of gender domination, then the
fact that an employee harasses both sexes should be irrelevant to a determi-
nation that the behavior falls within the purview of Title VII.
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who harasses both men and women."87 Critics of this result note
in particular that victims of equal opportunity harassment suffer
the same effects of sexual harassment as victims of opposite-sex
sexual harassment: "the offensiveness of the harassment is not
lessened merely because the employer also harasses men. To the
woman it is the harassment itself that offends."88
This loophole in Title VII doctrine has resulted in cases where
the defendant invokes the "bisexual defense" as a means of
avoiding liability under Title VII. 9 In cases like Ryczek, the
defendant argues the alleged harasser is bisexual, and the court
must then hear debate over his or her sexual orientation. 0 In
other cases the defendant provides evidence that the alleged
harasser sexually harassed members of both sexes equally.9' In
87. Ryczek v. Guest Servs., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1995). "In
addition to this troubling possibility, the prospect of having litigants debate and
juries determine the sexual orientation of Title VII defendants is a rather
unpleasant one." Id. "One can only speculate as to what would be legally
sufficient to submit the issue of a supervisor's bisexuality to the jury. Would
the supervisor's sworn statement of his or her bisexuality be adequate? Would
the supervisor need to introduce affirmative evidence of his liaisons with
members of both sexes?" Id. at 762 n.7; see also Paul, supra note 39, at 351-52
("The identical offense is sex discrimination under Title VII when perpetrated
by a man against a woman, by a man against a man, by a woman against a
woman, or by a woman against a man; yet if a bisexual of either sex preys
equally upon men and women, he-or she-is beyond the reach of Title VII.")
88. Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Sexual Harassment and Title WI-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1096 (1989).
89. See, e.g., Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C.
1995) (noting defendants argued if any discrimination was committed it was
perpetrated by bisexual supervisors, an offense not actionable under Title VII);
see also Cabaniss v. Coosa Valley Medical Ctr., No. CV 93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL
241937, at *13 (N.D. Ala. March 20, 1995) (noting defendants' argument that
the alleged harasser treated males no differently than females); Ryczek, 877 F.
Supp. at 761-62 (noting that the parties were arguing over the issue of whether
defendant was bisexual or a lesbian); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Wyo. 1993) (describing defendant's argument that because
he harassed both male and female employees, he did not discriminate against
plaintiffs based on gender); cf. McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc.,
878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that because defendant had not
argued that the plaintiffs harasser also harassed the opposite sex, the
defendant was still liable under Title VII); Paul, supra note 39, at 351-52 ("[I]f
sexual harassment is sexual discrimination under Title VII, why are some
perpetrators insulated? A savvy harasser need only note this anomaly and
become an equal opportunity harasser.").
90. See, e.g., Ryczek, 877 F. Supp. at 761-62 (stating that parties were
arguing over issue of whether defendant was bisexual or a lesbian).
91. See, e.g., Cabaniss, 1995 WL 241937 at *13 (noting defendants'
argument that the alleged harasser treated males no differently than females);
Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336 (describing defendant's argument that because
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both types of cases courts typically decline to challenge the sexual
harassment standards giving rise to this Title VII loophole.s2
4. Sex Stereotyping
Recently, some feminist theorists have postulated that
discrimination is not only about some individuals treating other
individuals differently, but also about creating differences at a
societal or institutional level that advantage and disadvantage
people in unequal ways.93  Under this "anti-subordination"
theory, sex discrimination occurs in two steps. First it occurs
through gender differentiation, creating mutually exclusive
gender scripts for males and females. Second, it occurs by
rewarding those characteristics 4 associated with being male and
penalizing and subordinating those characteristics associated with
being female.95 Sex discrimination thus is the act of perpetuating
a sexual hierarchy,96 a social order in which men and all that is
associated with being male rank higher than women and all that
is associated with being female.97
Sexual harassment under this analysis is seen as a tool for
maintaining the gender hierarchy; it is a method of control and
the supervisor harassed both male and female employees, he did not discrimi-
nate against plaintiffs based on gender).
92. See Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 288 (holding a bisexual supervisor who
singles out only one sex for sexual harassment liable under Title VII, but
leaving unresolved the issue of equal opportunity harassment); Ryczek, 877 F.
Supp. at 762 (declining to rule on the issue of whether a person who harasses
members of both sexes escapes Title VII liability). But see Chiapuzio, 826 F.
Supp. at 1337 (rejecting current sexual harassment standards and holding equal
harassment of both genders does not escape Title VII liability).
93. MACKINNON, supra note 83, at 105; Becker, supra note 27, at 208;
Finley, supra note 25, at 1154.
94. Seegenerally JOYCE M. NIELSEN, SEX AND GENDER IN SOcIETY 16-17 (2d
ed. 1990) (discussing types of rewards involved in a system of sex stratification).
95. BEM, supra note 63, at 80-81; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 65, at 9, 14,
233 (arguing society perpetuates gender inequality by ranking those character-
istics associated with men higher than those associated with women); Capers,
supra note 59, at 1160-62 (describing how society constructs and maintains a
gender dichotomy); cf PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 70 (1990)
(describing the ways in which society posits one-half of dichotomies as superior
to others). ,
96. See Colker, supra note 26, at 1007-08 (discussing an anti-subordination
approach to characterizing policies as discriminatory).
97. EPSTEIN, supra note 65, at 233.
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punishment for those who deviate from scripted gender norms. 98
Andrea Dworkin writes, for example, that women's domain is the
house and men's domain is the public world.99 When a woman
ventures into the wider world, "she is an unwanted alien, at best
a guest worker with a short-term visa, a stigmatized immi-
grant.""° Outside, she is in "male territory, a hands-on zone; her
presence there is taken to be a declaration of availability-for sex
and sexual insult."''
Feminist legal theorists have hailed the sex stereotyping
theory as an effective tool in applying an anti-subordination
approach to the problem of sexual harassment.' 2 The Supreme
Court first recognized the role sex stereotyping plays in sex
discrimination in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'° The plaintiff,
98. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 107 (1987)
(arguing sexual harassment both expresses and reinforces the social inequality
of women to men); Cain, supra note 25, at 200-01 (same); Stephanie Riger,
Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 497,503 (1991) (finding workplaces low in perceived equality are
the site of more frequent incidents of harassment and concluding that sexual
harassment both reflects and reinforces sexual inequality); cf Anita F. Hill,
Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1448
(1992) ("The reality is that [sexual harassment] is used to perpetuate a sense
of inequality, to keep women in their place notwithstanding our increasing
presence in the workplace.").
99. Andrea Dworkin, Women in the Public Domain: Sexual Harassment and
Date Rape, in SExuAL HARASSMENT: WOMEN SPEAK OUT 1-5 (Amber Coverdale
Sumrall & Dena Taylor eds., 1992).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 4.
102. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity:
Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 95, 116 (1992) (comparing sex stereotyping expert Susan Fiske's
analysis with current feminist scholarship).
103. 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the partners in a
national professional accounting firm denied plaintiffAnn Hopkins partnership
in the firm. After serving five years in a senior management position, Hopkins
received evaluations for partnership that noted she was an aggressive and
competent executive. Id. at 234. The partners described Hopkins as an
"outstanding professional" who had a "deft touch," a "strong character,
independence and integrity." Id. One client described her as "extremely
competent, intelligent," "strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and
creative." Id. Some partners, however, characterized her aggressiveness as
"macho." Id. at 235. Several partners criticized her use of profanity, one
partner suggesting in response that they objected to her swearing "because it's
a lady using foul language." Id. Another advised her to take a "course at
charm school." Id. Finally, in explaining the firm's decision to put Hopkins's
candidacy on hold, one partner advised that Hopkins could improve her chances
for partnership if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry." Id.
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Ann Hopkins, successfully introduced the theory to the court
through the expert testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a social scientist
specializing in stereotyping."°4  Hopkins alleged Price Water-
house had violated Title VII by permitting stereotyped ideas of
women and appropriate female behavior to play a significant role
in the denial of her partnership application. °5 The Supreme
Court held Price Waterhouse unlawfully discriminated against
Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and
effect to the partners' sex-stereotyped comments. °6
The theory of sex stereotyping draws on a body of research in
social psychology that explains stereotyping as a function of the
organizational structure of the workplace and discrimination as a
function of sex stereotyping. °7 According to Fiske, sex discrimi-
nation is not a rare occurrence traceable to the bad intentions of a
few people, but a by-product of a workplace that lacks a high
percentage of women in powerful positions.'0 5 When a group is
dramaticallyunderrepresentedin an organization, employers and
coworkers are more likely to perceive the token individuals in
terms of their social category.'0 9 "People expect token individu-
als to fit preconceived views about the traits of the group, to
manifest particular qualities. Tokens are highly visible as people
who are different, and they are not often permitted the individu-
104. Id.; Chamallas, supra note 33, at 95 n.36 (discussing the comparative
and "but for" standards).
105. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-32.
106. Id. at 250-52.
107. See Chamallas, supra note 102, at 114-15 (describing how sex
stereotyping research demonstrates the way organizational structure and
culture influence individual perceptions).
108. Chamallas, supra note 33, at 96. Critical to Fiske's analysis was
Hopkins's status as a "token woman" at Price Waterhouse, a phenomenon
known in social science research as a "rarity." Id.
109. Id. The sex stereotyping theory, a derivative of the theory of sex role
spillover, applies only to situations in which a member of a subordinate group
is working in an environment predominately made up of members of a
dominant group, typically a woman working in a mostly male occupation.
BARBARA A. GUTEI, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 132 (1985). In traditionally
female jobs, where women are the working majority, the jobs themselves take
on aspects of sex roles. Id. at 135. "Whereas women in nontraditional jobs are
viewed as women in jobs, women in traditionally female jobs are viewed as
women, period. The work role is the female sex role.... " Id. Different female
jobs emphasize different aspects of the female gender role. For example,
nursing and working with children, the aged, handicapped or poor are all jobs
that reflect the nurturing aspect of the female gender role. Id.
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ality of their unique, nonstereotypical characteristics.""' For
Fiske, the partners' gender-based characterizations of Hopkins
were a predictable response to her status as a token woman who
did not conform to traditional feminine standards."'
While Price Waterhouse was not a sexual harassment case, at
least one court has extended the prohibition against sex stereo-
typing to sexual harassment law." Courts have not, however,
been as receptive to attempts to use sex stereotyping theory as a
way of portraying same-sex harassment as sex discrimination.
1 3
In Dillon v. Frank,"' for example, Ernest Dillon alleged his male
coworkers had sexually harassed him by taunting him with lewd
expressions. 5 At oral argument, Dillon advanced a sex stereo-
typing argument: his coworkers did not consider him "macho"
enough and therefore verbally abused him based on prevailing
stereotypes of what behavior is appropriate for men and
women." 6 The court rejected the sex stereotyping argument,
holding Dillon's coworkers deprived him of a proper work environ-
ment not because of his gender, but because of his alleged homo-
110. Chamallas, supra note 33, at 96-97. Fiske noted that under conditions
of rarity, evaluators will scrutinize women more closely than men on "feminine
dimensions" such as social skills and personality, and that evaluators will focus
less on "masculine" task or performance measures. Id. at 98. This means that
a token woman's "shortcomings" become highly visible, in addition to being
shaped in a gender-coded fashion. Id.
111. Id. at 98.
112. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991). In Robinson, the plaintiff was one of a few women working in a skilled
crafts position at the shipyards. Male employees described the worksite as a
"boys club" and "more or less a man's world." Id. at 1493. Pictures of nude or
partially nude women were visible throughout the workplace. The plaintiff used
the sex stereotyping theory to provide a framework for placing the sexual
behavior of men at shipyards into a larger pattern of gender stereotyping. See
Chamallas, supra note 102, at 111 (describing the use of Fiske's testimony in
arguing that sexual harassment is part of a greater form of sex discrimination).
113. See Capers, supra note 59, at 1176 (noting courts have been reluctant
to find discrimination based on sex stereotyping in cases involving sexual
orientation).
114. 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 at 70,101 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
Ernest Dillon worked as a mail handler at the Bulk Mail Center in Allen Park,
Michigan.
115. During the course of his employment, his coworkers taunted him with
expressions like "fag" and "Dillon sucks dicks." Id. at 70,102. Graffiti appeared
on conveyer belts and loading trucks with the words "Dillon gives head." Id. at
70,102-03. When management failed to stop the harassment, Dillon sued in
federal court alleging sexual harassment under Title VII. Id. at 70,103.
116. Id. at 70,105.
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sexuality."' '"These actions, although cruel, are not made illegal
by Title VII."
118
II. ANALYZING THE "BUT FOR" TEST, COMPARATIVE
STANDARD, AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEM OF SAME-SEX AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. THE "BUT FOR" TEST AS A DISCRETIONARY TOOL FOR
DISCRIMINATION
Victims of both same-sex and equal opportunity sexual
harassment face two obstacles to establishing a prima facie case of
sexual harassment, both derived from the Title VII requirement
that a plaintiff prove harassment occurred "because of' sex. The
first obstacle is purely definitional: what behavior constitutes
harassment based on sex? While courts typically apply the "but
for" standard to determine causation, the absence of any precise
definition for "sex" allows judges wide latitude in defining the
behavior for which the court may then hold a harasser liable." 9
This discretion negatively affects all victims of sexual harassment,
but same-sex harassment strikingly illustrates the consequences
117. Id. at 70,107.
118. Id. The court rejected the application of Price Waterhouse because the
court could find "no specific evidence of sex-stereotyped remarks." Id. at 70,108.
Critical to the court's analysis of remarks made to or about Dillon, was the
assumption that "sex" in Title VII refers to what is biological, and not to gender:
"Because the very concept and definition of the word 'sex' is at issue in this
case, [this court] will generally use terms such as 'being male or female' to
mean the genetic concept of the sex of a human as transmitted by the sex
chromosome of the father." Id. at 70,104 n.2. Many courts have interpreted
Title VII's "sex" provision to mean either sex or gender. See supra note 58
(citing cases which have interpreted "sex" in Title VII to mean either sex or
gender).
119. In Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., for example, the court found that
while certain cartoons displayed in the workplace bearing plaintiffs name "were
sexually oriented, crude, deviant and personally offensive," the plaintiff was not
entitled to relief under the Louisiana equal employment statute because
plaintiff had not shown that the cartoons were labelled with her name merely
because of her sex. 517 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 520
So. 2d 425 (La. 1988). "The cartoons in the men's room were labelled with the
names of both male and female employees. This fact precludes plaintiff from
establishing a case of sexual harassment." Id.; cf Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding where supervisor
who is abusive to both men and women, but limits gender-specific abuses to
females, hostile environment is based on sex), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733
(1995).
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of judicial discretion for victims attempting to establish a prima
facie case.
Because neither Title VII nor the Supreme Court has clearly
defined "sex,"2 ' courts are allowed to determine whether
harassment occurs because of sex or because of factors which
courts have determined lie outside the purview of Title VII, such
as sexual orientation."2 This discretion to invoke a victim's
sexual orientation as a reason for dismissing a Title VII cause of
action typically comes into play only in same-sex harassment
cases. In a "classic" sexual harassment case in which a man
sexually harasses a woman, the court typically does not raise the
issue of sexual orientation. For example, the court does not reason
that a man harasses a woman because he is heterosexual. But
when a man harasses another man, most courts hold the harasser
sexually harassed the victim not because of the victim's sex, but
because of his real or perceived homosexuality." If the court
were to look consistently at the sexual orientation of the victim in
determining whether harassment occurs because of sex, then the
rationale that bars claims based on same-sex harassment would
bar all claims of sexual harassment: sexual orientation is equally
involved in both."s
Those courts that have accepted same-sex sexual harassment
claims simply have applied the discretionary "but for" test in the
opposite way. Theyhave held sexual harassment by a homosexual
supervisor of the same sex is an adverse employment action the
subordinate would not have faced but for his or her sex."
120. See Valdes, supra note 58, at 23-24 (noting consequences of having no
clear legal definition of "sex").
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting Title VII sexual
harassment claims based on sexual orientation are not actionable).
122. See Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 41,332, at 70,104 (6th
Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (finding plaintiffs coworkers harassed him because they
believed he was gay); Carreno v. Local Union No. 226, No. 89-4083-S, 1990 WL
159199, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990) (finding plaintiff was not harassed
because he is a male, but rather because he is a homosexual male); cf Fox v.
Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (D. Nev. 1995) (finding plaintiffs do
not perceive work environment to be hostile to them because they are men, but
because they may not be entirely at ease with sexuality in general or
homosexuality in particular).
123. See Marcosson, supra note 77, at 32 (discussing sexuality as an element
of all sexual harassment claims).
124. See, e.g., EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D.
Tenn. 1995) (stating same-sex sexual harassment is an adverse employment
action that victim would not have faced but for his or her sex); Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (same), affd 749 F.2d
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Courts thus interpret virtually identical behavior as occurring
because of sex in some cases and because of sexual orientation in
others.'25 In distinguishing unlawful harassment based on sex
or gender from lawful harassment based on sexual orientation,
courts often conflate the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation on "an ad hoc and strategic basis."'26 "The bottom
line of the doctrinal status quo is that courts can and do character-
ize sex and gender discrimination as sexual orientation discrimi-
nation virtually at will."1
27
B. THE COMPARATIVE STANDARD-AN INEFFECTIVE MEASURE
OF DISCRIMINATION
Victims of same-sex and equal opportunity harassment also
face doctrinal difficulties in establishing prima facie cases of
sexual harassment. Because Title VII is based on the formal
equality doctrine,'2 courts in sexual harassment cases apply the
comparative standard 29 to assess whether men and women
receive equal treatment in the workplace." ° Victims of same-sex
and equal opportunity sexual harassmentillustrate the inadequa-
cies of this characterization of discrimination: discrimination can
occur without regard to whether an employer treats a member of
the opposite sex differently.
Sex discrimination occurs when one sex is subordinated to the
other. A system in which one sex is subordinated to the other
732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307,
310 (N.D. IM. 1981) (same).
125. Compare Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1135-36
(C.D. IMl. 1995) (holding harassment was actionable where male supervisor
subjected male employee to sexually suggestive comments and improper
physical sexual contacts) with Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 490,
494 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding harassment was not actionable where male
manager made sexually suggestive comments and improper physical sexual
contacts to male employee). In cases involving anti-gay or heterosexual male
to male harassment, courts universally interpret the harassment as occurring
because of sexual orientation. See supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing cases in which courts hold Title VII does not proscribe anti-gay
harassment).
126. Valdes, supra note 58, at 23.
127. Id. at 24.
128. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing the equality doctrine generally).
129. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the comparative
standard test generally).
130. See Chamallas, supra note 33, at 100 (discussing the relationship
between the comparative standard and the goal of equal opportunity).
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presupposes two distinct categories of people.' Thus, to pre-
serve a system of discrimination, it becomes important to create
and preserve differences between the sexes. When supervisors or
coworkers harass an employee based on gender or gender stereo-
types, they reinforce the differences that support a system of
subordination. Harassment based on gender or gender stereotypes
reinforces a system of sex discrimination despite the fact that the
harasser does not want to harm a member of his or her own sex or
treat a member of the opposite sex differently. A comparative
standard thus fails to recognize these cases as sex discrimination.
C. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO SAME-SEX AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
One proposed solution to the problem of same-sex and equal
opportunity sexual harassment involves either an amendment to
Title VII to include sexual orientation as a protected class,132 or
new federal legislation to prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. 33 Currently, victims of same-sex
and equal opportunity sexual harassment are unable to bring
claims under Title VII because courts find the category "sex" too
narrow to include these types of harassment. While enactment of
anti-discrimination legislation would make it easier for victims of
same-sex and equal opportunity sexual harassment to establish a
prima facie case of sexual harassment, such legislation fails to
address the problems of using the "but for" and comparative
standards in sexual harassment law."M The "but for" and com-
131. See FRYE, supra note 63, at 33 (discussing the way a system of
domination and subordination is constructed).
132. See, e.g., Peluso, supra note 17, at 1549-60 (arguing that sexual
orientation should stand on equal footing with other classes protected by Title
VII because it contains all of the elements that courts require of a suspect
class); cf Judith L. Dillon, Note, A Proposal to Ban Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Private Employment in Vermont, 15 VT. L. REV. 435, 471
(1991) (arguing that because courts are reluctant to grant legal protection to
gays and lesbians under Title VII, state and local legislatures must enact anti-
discrimination legislation).
133. The 104th Congress has introduced two bills that would prohibit
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. S. 932, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995). The Senate bill is pending in the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the House bill is pending in the
Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.
134. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (discussing problems
with comparative standard in sexual harassment law).
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parative standards 135 can effectively eliminate, at the judge's dis-
cretion, cases of harassment that do not involve women being
treated differently from men, but that perpetuate gender stereo-
types in ways that maintain systems of gender discrimination. 3 '
III. AN ANTI-SUBORDINATION ANALYSIS: MOVING THE
FOCUS FROM GENDER EQUALITY TO GENDER
DOMINATION
A more effective solution to the problem of same-sex and equal
opportunity sexual harassment focuses not on gender equality, but
on the persistent domination of one gender by another. Rather
than asking whether an employer treats men and women differ-
ently, the analysis asks how the perception of difference originates
and how it is maintained.' Such a dominance analysis would
replace both the "but for" and comparative standards with a test
which asks whether the victim endured harassment that perpetu-
ated gender stereotypes in the workplace. The dominance analysis
attempts to disrupt the system of gender subordination through a
three-step process. First, it recognizes the role gender differences
play in sexual harassment. Second, it analyzes to whose advan-
tage and disadvantage those differences work. Finally, it holds
harassers accountable by imposing Title VII liability for harass-
ment that reinforces gender differences and women's subordinate
position in society.
A. THE DOMINANCE ANALYSIS
1. Recognizing Gender Differences
The most effective way to subordinate is to make it seem as if
the dominance of men and the subordination of women occurs not
because of any human decision or custom, but as a result of the
135. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (describing the "but for"
and comparative standards).
136. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination
on the basis of gender stereotypes as a form of sex discrimination).
137. See FRYE, supra note 63, at 13-14 (arguing that to analyze barriers to
equality one must ask who constructs and maintains the barrier and to whose
benefit or detriment it works); Chamallas, supra note 33, at 109 (arguing that
rather than inquiring whether difference exists, the inquiry should be directed




natural consequences of biology.' 8 One could argue that it
appears natural that women act deferentially and passively and
men act aggressively and competitively. Thus, it appears only
natural that men advance further in their careers and earn more
money because they are "naturally" more aggressive and competi-
tive.
Feminists premise the gender domination analysis on the idea
that sex discrimination exists predominately because of a rigid
gender dichotomy that posits one sex (and its host of associated
gender characteristics) as superior to the other.13 9 The gender
dichotomy works by first defining mutually exclusive scripts for
being male and female and then by punishing those who deviate
from their appropriate gender scripts. 4 ° A dominance approach
to sex discrimination, then, recognizes that men and women act
partly as they have been trained to act." "That we are trained
to behave so differently as women and as men, and to behave so
differently toward women and toward men, itself contributes
mightily to the appearance of extreme natural dimorphism....
We do become what we practice being."4' If sex roles were
biological, there would be no need for coercion, no need for
penalties for nonconforming gender behavior.1 Recognizing
gender differences as social constructions provides an important
first step toward the recognition of the methods by which society
subordinates women.
138. See FRYE, supra note 63, at 34. According to Frye:
For efficient subordination, what's wanted is that the structure [gender
hierarchy] not appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human
decision or custom, but that it appear natural. . .. It must seem
natural that individuals of one category are dominated by individuals
of the other and that as groups, the one dominates the other.
'd-
139. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (discussing gender
stratification generally).
140. See BEM, supra note 63, at 80-81 (describing how society constructs and
maintains a gender dichotomy); EPSTEIN, supra note 65, at 140 (discussing the
"constant enforcement of social controls on the behavior of men and women
through punishments and rewards"); Capers, supra note 59, at 1160-63
(describing how society constructs and maintains a gender dichotomy).
141. See generally FRYE, supra note 63, at 23-34 (discussing how social
controls influence the way men and women act).
142. Id. at 34.
143. See EPSTEIN, supra note 65, at 10 ("Social groups do not depend on
instincts or physiology to enforce social arrangements because they cannot
reliably do so."); FRYE, supra note 63, at 35-36 (discussing social pressure to
conform to gender roles).
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2. Policing Gender Boundaries
Because employers reward men more frequently than women,
"men have a stake in justifying and continuing the status
quo."' Preserving gender distinctions goes hand in hand with
preserving the rewards men derive from these distinctions.
145
Sexual harassment acts in this context both as a penalty for
departing from scripted gender norms and as a method of main-
taining the gender hierarchy.
In opposite-sex, equal opportunity, and sexual harassment
cases in which a homosexual supervisor harasses an employee of
the same sex, the harasser makes the victim feel like a sex object.
Sex objects are usually women. 46 For a woman, feeling like a
sex object reminds her that she is a woman trespassing in a man's
world; sexual harassment subordinates women by penalizing them
for crossing gender boundaries. 47 Male victims of sexual harass-
ment in these cases are victims of a "system of gender domination
whose principle effect is to subordinate women."'48 When a
person sexually harasses a man, the harasser both feminizes him
and reinforces the idea that those qualities asso ciated with women
are subordinate to the qualities associated with men. 49
The policing of gender boundaries is clearest in anti-gay
144. EPSTEIN, supra note 65, at 9. "Challenges to a social order do not
typically come from those who benefit from its arrangements." Id. Epstein also
notes that dichotomous categories like male and female (and the host of
characteristics associated with each) are "especially effective as an ideological
mechanism to preserve advantage." Id. at 233.
145. See FRYE, supra note 63, at 13 ('The boundary that sets apart women's
sphere is maintained and promoted by men generally for the benefit of men
generally.").
146. "One of the ways gender stratification is maintained is by emphasizing
sex role expectations. Being a sex object is part of the female sex role. Sexual
harassment is a reminder to women of their status as sex objects; even at work,
women are sex objects." GUTEK, supra note 109, at 10. Patricia Hill Collins
argues that "domination always involves attempts to objectify the subordinate
group." COLLINS, supra note 95, at 69. "As subjects, people have the right to
define their own reality, establish their own identities, ... [but] [als objects
one's reality is defined by others, one's identity is created by others." Id.
(quoting BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACM THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 42
(1989)).
147. See supra note 144 (describing the dichotomous categories of male and
female).
148. Chamallas, supra note 102, at 129 (discussing the operation of sexism
on the male sexual harassment plaintiff).




harassment cases, where supervisors or coworkers harass an
employee for exhibiting characteristics of the opposite sex.
Goluszek's coworkers, for example, harassed Goluszek for being
"effeminate." 5 ' Harassment was the penalty for not conforming
to their image of male heterosexuality. 5' By policing gender
boundaries in this way, Goluszek's coworkers preserved the
differences between the sexes as well as the hierarchy which forms
the basis of sex discrimination.
B. SEX STEREOTYPING-THE VALUE OF PRICE WATERHOUSE
Sex stereotyping theory plays an integral role in a dominance
analysis of Title VII cases. The Court in Price Waterhouse held
that Title VII prohibited employment discrimination based on sex
stereotyping.'52 "MW]e are beyond the day," wrote Justice
Brennan, "when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
"~153with their group ....
Rather than asking, as the comparative analysis does,
whether the partners at Price Waterhouse would have selected
Ann Hopkins for partner if she were a man,154 a dominance
analysis examines which groups are in dominant and subordinate
positions of power at Price Waterhouse and the reinforcing effect
of sex stereotyping on those positions. In Price Waterhouse, men
were overwhelmingly in positions of power.'55 Sex stereotyping
reinforced their dominant position in two ways. It created
expectations that Hopkins should exhibit stereotypically feminine
150. Chamallas, supra note 102, at 129; see also Kathryn Abrams, Title VII
and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2516 (1994) (arguing
that Goluszek suffered either a form of gender discrimination against
women-derision of some of the same qualities that make women targets for
sexual harassment-or a form of discrimination against men that disciplines a
subset of men for abandoning the qualities associated with men). For facts and
holding of Goluszek, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
151. See Chamallas, supra note 102, at 127-29 (providing a dominance
analysis of the Goluszek facts).
152. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding of Price Waterhouse).
153. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
154. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing Price
Waterhouse); see also Chamallas, supra note 33, at 109 ("The comparative
question presupposes that a judge can discover whether there are salient
differences about the person being judged-besides a difference in gender-that
might justify treating her unfavorably.").
155. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233 (describing the gender compo-
sition at the Price Waterhouse firm).
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qualities that employers do not value in workers and then it
penalized her for deviating from those expectations. "An employer
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermis-
sible Catch 22: out of ajob if they behave aggressively and out of a
job if they do not." 5' To preserve their dominant positions, the
Price Waterhouse partners reinforced the distinctions between
men and women and penalized Hopkins for not acting "according
to script." After the partnership decision, the gender hierarchy
was left intact: the partners were still overwhelmingly male, and
Hopkins was still a subordinate. 57
Stereotypical definitions of gender play a role in all of the
various kinds of sexual harassment: opposite sex, same-sex, anti-
gay, and equal opportunity harassment. Coworkers and em-
ployers punish men and women who do not conform to their
"proper" gender roles. Men who express some characteristics of a
female gender role, or women who express characteristics of a
male gender role, blur lines and merge the distinctions between
those that dominate and those that are dominated.' 5 Sex
stereotyping offers a way of holding people accountable when they
use gender role nonconformity as a reason for harassment.
C. RESOLVING THE INADEQUACIES OF THE "BUT FOR" TEST
For victims of"classic" male on female sexual harassment, the
dominance analysis would make it far easier for a plaintiffto meet
the Title VII "because of ... sex" requirement.'59 Instead of
having to prove gender was the sole reason for the harassment
under the "but for" test, a plaintiff would have to show only that
gender or gender stereotyping was one reason for the harassment.
Under the current "but for" test, judges have the power to infuse
their own value judgements about proper gender behaviors into
their determinations about whether harassment occurred because
of sex or because of "typical" male offensive behavior' 60 Ideas of
156. Id. at 251.
157. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text (discussing Price
Waterhouse).
158.' See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text (discussing how sexual
harassment penalizes gender deviations for each type of harassment).
159. See supra text accompanying note 16 (describing the prohibitions of
Title VII).
160. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding no hostile environment created by posters of nude women displayed by
plaintiff's male coworkers in their offices and by the repeated sexist obscenities
1042
1996] BISEXUAL DEFENSE LOOPHOLE 1043
what constitutes "typical" male and female behavior are precisely
the stereotypes this proposal seeks to eliminate. Allowing
evidence of gender stereotyping to establish a prima facie case of
sexual harassment significantly reduces judicial *discretion
because all harassment based on sex stereotyping would meet
Title VIIs "because of... sex" requirement.1
6
'
In the case of same-sex and anti-gay sexual harassment, this
analysis similarly eliminates judicial discretion in conflating
gender with sexual orientation.'62  In Dillon v. Frank,6 3 for
example, when the court applied the "but for" analysis to a case of
same-sex harassment, it concluded Dillon's coworkers did not
harass Dillon because he was a male, but because he was a
homosexual male."6 Using a dominance analysis in Dillon's
case, a court would first focus on how Dillon's workplace constructs
difference.'65 Dillon's coworkers singled him out and judged him
because he did not conform to stereotypical gender norms. 66 His
of coworkers), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
161. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
"but for" analysis).
162. See supra notes 119-127 and accompanying text (discussing the
tendency of judges to conflate sex with sexual orientation).
163. 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,322 at 70,101 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
see supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and
holding of Dillon).
164. See Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 70,107. The Dillon court also
noted that in Price Waterhouse the Court found sex stereotyping created an
"intolerable and impermissible Catch-22" (a woman who acts womanly will not
get promoted, and a woman who does not act womanly will not get promoted).
Id. at 70,108-09 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
Dillon, the court argued, did not face such a Catch-22. Id. at 70,109. To argue
because Dillon was a male, and male characteristics are consistent with those
qualities valued in employment, misses the point of the Price Waterhouse
decision. Id. The major focus of Title VIrs legislative history, the Court noted
in Price Waterhouse, is the intent to force employers to "focus on qualifications
rather than race, religion, sex or national origin." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 243. When an employee endures harassment motivated in part because of
gender-regardless of the employee's actual biological sex-that employee
should be able to pursue a Title VII remedy. In Price Waterhouse, the Court did
not state that a Catch-22 was required for sex-stereotyping to play a role in the
court's analysis, only that in Hopkins's case the sex-stereotyping did in fact
create such a dilemma. See id. at 251.
165. The sex stereotyping theory is useful here because it shows how the
structural features of a workplace, demographics, and organization shape
individual views about proper gender expectations and behavior. See supra
notes 107-111 and accompanying text (describing the sex stereotyping theory
generally).
166. See Marcosson, supra note 77, at 26. Marcosson states:
One would not expect Dillon's coworkers to harass him with, "Dillon
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coworkers did not perceive him as "macho" enough and verbally
and physically abused him for demonstrating real or perceived
characteristics of a subordinate sex. 6 ' Under the dominance
analysis, a court should find gender stereotypes were prevalent in
Dillon's workplace and the stereotypes stigmatized a member of a
subordinate group to the advantage of a dominant group. To deny
Dillon a cause of action under these circumstances is to preserve
the gender hierarchy in his workplace; to hold his employer
accountable for his harassment is to disrupt it.
D. RESOLVING THE INADEQUACIES OF THE COMPARATIVE
STANDARD
Finally, the dominance analysis moves away from the idea
that sex discrimination only occurs when women are treated
differently than men. Under existing sexual harassment stan-
dards, victims of equal opportunity sexual harassment cannot
prove the harassment they endured violated Title VII. 68 Defen-
dants take advantage of this loophole by claiming the harasser was
bisexual or that he or she harassed men and women equally.
169
The dominance theory recognizes that when an equal opportunity
harasser sexually harasses both men and women, he or she
reinforces the idea that being a sex object, a gender stereotype
usually associated with women but also transferrable to men, is a
subordinate status in society."' An equal opportunity harasser,
like all people who harass, reinforces the sexual hierarchy by
taking advantage of the sex object stereotype. The dominance
analysis holds individuals liable for any harassment based on
gender or gender stereotypes that reinforces this sexual hierarchy,
regardless of the sex or sexual orientation of the victims.
sucks dicks," and then quickly add, "But that would be OK if you were
a woman." The fact that they harassed him over their belief that he
did it, and did not harass any women, makes the distinction between
what they found acceptable for one sex and not the other obvious ....
Id.
167. Dillon might have demonstrated certain real effeminate characteristics,
but Dillon's coworkers believed that his effeminacy implied homosexuality.
Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 70,105-07. Much of the abuse Dillon
suffered was based on perceived "transgressions" of the male gender script.
168. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing the inability
of victims of equal opportunity harassment to establish Title VII claims).
169. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
defendants raise the "bisexual defense").
170. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text (discussing sexual




The hypothetical case of the equal opportunity harasser, an
inconsistency in sexual harassment doctrine that courts have
universally acknowledged, has now become a reality. The increas-
ing use of the "bisexual defense" to escape Title VII liability
illustrates one of the fundamental inadequacies of the comparative
standard in sexual harassment law. It leads one to question how
courts can uphold the letter and spirit of Title VIIs proscription
against discrimination if they cannot, consistent with current
sexual harassment doctrines, offer victims of equal opportunity
harassment a remedy for the harassment they endure. The rise in
same-sex sexual harassment suits has similarly challenged the
logic of applying the "but for" test to sexual harassment law. Both
same-sex and equal opportunity harassment cases compel the
courts to reexamine their use of standards which are not only
incapable of redressing the kinds of sex discrimination these
victims endure, but are incapable of challenging the roots of sex
discrimination common to all instances of sexual harassment. By
recognizing that gender stereotypes systematically advantage men
and disadvantage women, and by holding employers accountable
for behavior that reinforces these gender stereotypes, a dominance
analysis seeks to disrupt the gender hierarchy on which sex
discrimination is based.
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